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Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the Japanese econ-
omy and its problems after the global financial crisis, and to discuss the 
prescription which the government is carrying out. The discussion in this 
paper shows the importance of new opportunities for the Japanese econ-
omy, such as those for V-4 and Japan cooperation, which is the main 
topic of this conference.
When the global financial crisis hit the world economy, Japan had not 
fully recovered from the sustained stagnation after the burst of the Jap-
anese bubble in the early 1990s. This made it more difficult for Japan to 
cope with its economic difficulties. The global financial crisis, together 
with the earthquake disaster in 2011, kept the economy slow, and the gov-
ernment announced a package of economic policies called “Abenomics” 
in early 2013 to revitalize the economy. 
Section 2 provides an overview of the situation of the Japanese econ-
omy in order to discuss its current problems. Then Section 3 examines 
how effective the “Abenomics” has been to solve the problems. Since it 
consists of three major policies, the effect of each of them is discussed. 
The discussion here shows that the Japan needs new economic opportu-
nities for revitalization.
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The “Lost Two Decades”  
and the global financial crisis
The Japanese economy was in a sustained stagnation called the “lost two 
decades” when the global financial crisis hit the world. Hence this section 
provides an overview of the economic situation during these decades and 
discusses the problems that should be solved in order to recover from the 
damage caused by the global financial crisis.
The Japanese economy enjoyed the prosperity brought about by the 
bubble in the late 1980s, but the bubble burst in early 1990s, which start-
ed Japan’s sustained stagnation. Figure 1 below shows this economic sit-
uation. Economic growth slowed down sharply in early 1990s, and the 
inflation rate is negative in most of the periods after 1994.
It is widely admitted that the stagnation was caused by the structural 
problems of the economy.1 During the prosperity of the bubble, ineffi-
cient firms – which should have been expelled from the market – sur-
1 For example, see Miyao (2006), chap. 8.
2. 
Fig. 1. Japanese economy in the lost two decades
Note: Real GDP growth rate and the rate of change in GDP deflator
Source: Cabinet Office, Japan
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vived, and they were reluctant to make efforts to become efficient. Such 
firms are now called “zombie” firms,2 and they kept surviving even after 
the burst of bubble. They exhibited low productivity, so they stagnated 
the economy. They also had troubles in paying back their bank bor-
rowings, which led to an accumulation of nonperforming loans which 
amounted to 40 trillion yen in 2002. This damaged the banking sector 
and caused a credit crunch, which deteriorated the situation of the Jap-
anese economy.
In order to revitalize the firms, and thus the economy, the zombie 
firms needed to become efficient, or they needed to be expelled from the 
market to shift their capital and labor to other efficient firms. To promote 
such structural changes, the government needed to offer a more compet-
itive free market environment for firms and their production activities, 
instead of protecting them.
The government prompted the banks to deal with the nonperforming 
loans, aimed both at promoting the structural changes and easing the 
credit crunch. The nonperforming loans began to decrease after 2002, 
and the Japanese economy was beginning to pick up slowly. By 2006, the 
economy seemed to have attained steady growth, though the structural 
problems were not completely removed.
It was then that the global financial crisis hit the world. The crisis 
had a huge negative impact on many developed countries, and Japan 
was no exception, as shown in Figure 1. However, as the financial mar-
kets returned to normal, the affected countries quickly started recov-
ering. For example, the U.S., the U.K. and the Eurozone underwent 
deflation, but their CPI inflation rates reverted to positive by the end 
of 2009, while that of Japan stayed negative.3 The crisis had a  more 
severe and longer impact on the Japanese economy, mainly because Ja-
pan had not fully solved the structural problems that had arisen from 
the bubble and its burst.
Thus, Japan needed to solve its structural problems in order to recover 
its economic growth after the global financial crisis. Unfortunately, af-
ter the crisis, Japan suffered from the Earthquake in East Japan in 2011. 
These shocks kept depressing the economy and made the sustained stag-
nation even longer. To deal with the stagnation, the Abe administration 
introduced the package of economic policies called “Abenomics” in early 
2013. These are discussed in the next section.
2 The definition and details of zombie firms are given by Hoshi (2006).
3 For these data, refer to the International Financial Statistics at the IMF website.
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The three arrows of Abenomics
The package of economic policies known as “Abenomics” consists of 
three “arrows,” which are named after the old Japanese tale from the 16th 
century. The three arrows are shown in Figure 2.4 The first and second ar-
rows are the policies to affect demand-side of the economy, and the third 
arrow is the one aimed at affecting the supply-side, a distinction which is 
important to the later discussion in this paper.
Aggressive monetary policy
The first arrow is the quantitative easing, while the policy’s interest 
rate is kept as low as zero. In April 2013, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) 
announced that it would double the monetary base in two years to 
achieve 2% inflation. To increase the monetary base by more than 130 
trillion yen, the BOJ planned to purchase the Japanese Government 
Bonds (JGBs).5
4 The details of Abenomics are explained by the Cabinet’s document, “Basic Poli-
cies for Economic and Fiscal Management and Reform: Ending Deflation and Revi-
talizing the Economy,” in June 2013. The Cabinet provides its provisional English 
translation on its homepage.
5 See the statement on monetary policy by the BOJ on April 4, 2013.
Fig. 2. Three arrows of Abenomics
Source: Author
3.1.
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This aggressive policy of monetary easing had an immediate effect on 
the financial markets. Figure 3 shows the sharp increase in stock prices 
and drastic depreciation of the yen.
 However, its effect on economic growth and inflation remains con-
troversial. This is because the standard theories of monetary policy ar-
gue that an interest rate change plays a key role in order for the policy’s 
effect to be transmitted to economic activity. In Japan, with the interest 
rates near zero, there is no room for them to fall any further. Those who 
support the effectiveness of quantitative easing believe that inflationary 
expectation plays a key role, but this again is open to argument.6
Flexible fiscal policy
The second arrow is the fiscal expansion policy. Since the government 
expands its demand for goods and services, firms sell more to the govern-
ment, which pulls up the economy. 
The policy has an immediate effect on economic activity, but it is effec-
tive only so long as the government keeps spending. Any spending in ex-
cess of the tax revenue must of course be financed by borrowing. With the 
fiscal expansion policy, the government has accumulated a large national 
6 See Tanaka (2013) for detail.
Fig. 3. Stock prices and Foreign Exchange Rate
Note: Nikkei 225 index and nominal effective exchange rate of the Yen (2010 = 100)
Source: Yahoo! Japan and the Bank of Japan
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debt, which is expected to reach nearly 230% of GDP at the end of 2014.7 
This ratio is much worse than in Greece, and such an expansionary policy 
cannot be sustained forever. 
Moreover, there is a concern that the combination of the first and sec-
ond arrows may hurt fiscal discipline. With the huge outstanding JGBs, 
their interest rates are less than 1% because the BOJ is keeping them low 
by purchasing the JGBs. The government plans to issue 84.2 trillion yen 
of JGBs in total in the fiscal years of 2013 and 2014.8 The BOJ plans to 
purchase 7 trillion yen of JGBs per month from the market during these 
two years and to increase its JGB holdings by 50 trillion yen per year.9 
The BOJ’s holding reached 215 trillion yen, which is 21% of the entire 
outstanding JGB, in June 2014.10 Even though direct underwriting by the 
BOJ is prohibited, the central bank is virtually supporting the fiscal deficit 
through the market.
Thus, Japan is facing the choice between economic growth and fiscal 
discipline. The government raised the rate of consumption tax (VAT) in 
April 2014, and it aroused concern over its negative effect on economic 
growth. The government is working on some other tax reforms to achieve 
a well-balanced combination of growth and discipline.
New growth strategy
The third arrow is industrial policy. It is a policy to offer a competitive 
free market environment for firms and their production activities by de-
regulation, tax reduction, subsidization, building infrastructure, and so 
on. While the first and second arrows affect the demand-side of economy, 
the third arrow affects its supply-side.
The demand-side policies may be able to stimulate the economy by 
expanding demand, but they do not solve the structural problems that 
inefficient firms face in their production activities as suppliers. It is indus-
trial policy that helps these firms to become efficient and productive, i.e. 
to solve their structural problems.
As discussed in Section 2, Japan has been suffering from its structural 
problems for more than two decades. Therefore, the third arrow is the 
policy aimed at eliminating the real causes underlying the sustained stag-
nation.
7 Estimated by the OECD in June 2014.
8 The JGB issuance plans for 2013 and 2014 by the Ministry of Finance.
9 See the statement on monetary policy by the BOJ on April 4, 2013.
10 The BOJ’s Flow of Funds data.
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Industrial policy is important but often difficult to carry out. This is 
because it often generates conflicts of interest among industries or any 
other economic groups. For example, lowering trade barriers benefits 
competitive manufacturers, but is often disadvantageous to the domestic 
agricultural industry. Thus, the Abe administration needs to coordinate 
the various interests in order to carry out industrial policy.
One of the important measures for industrial policy is to develop new 
business opportunities, both domestic and international, for firms. So, 
the main topic of this conference, “New Opportunities for Japan and V-4 
Cooperation,” is very important for Japan in this context, and this impor-
tance is reflected by the statement issued at the meeting of the V-4 and 
Japanese Prime Ministers in June 2013.
Japanese firms have been seeking for new opportunities in foreign 
countries and have been making a  large amount of foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI). However, although the yen is depreciating (as shown in 
Fig.  3), Japan is also experiencing a  trade deficit (as shown in Fig. 4). 
The trade deficit puts downward pressure on FDI, and so the government 
needs to deal with the situation before FDI begins to have difficulties in 
sustaining its present level. 
Fig. 4. Trade and FDI
Note: Net export of goods and services, and net outflow of FDI
Source: Ministry of Finance, Japan
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Concluding remarks
This paper has presented an overview of the present condition of the Jap-
anese economy after the global financial crisis and discussed the prescrip-
tion that the Abe administration is implementing. The discussion here 
shows the importance of new economic opportunities, including those 
between V-4 countries and Japan.
When the global financial crisis hit the world, Japan had not fully re-
covered from the sustained stagnation after the burst of its bubble in the 
early 1990s, which made the Japanese recovery slower than other devel-
oped countries. So, this paper has discussed the real causes underlying 
the Japanese stagnation and slower recovery, and the discussion made it 
clear that they were structural problems.
Next the package of economic policies called “Abenomics” was exam-
ined. The examination carried out in this paper has shown that, among 
the three policies (“arrows”) in Abenomics, only industrial policy solves 
the real causes of Japanese stagnation. One of the means for such indus-
trial policy is to develop new economic opportunities, both domestic and 
international, and thus seeking out new opportunities among V-4 coun-
tries and Japan is important for Japan’s economic revitalization. 
Streszczenie
Celem artykułu jest analiza problemów, przed jakimi stanęła gospodarka 
japońska po globalnym kryzysie finansowym z 2008 roku, a także prze-
śledzenie programu, jaki uruchomił rząd Japonii w celu ich rozwiązania, 
czy chociażby złagodzenia. W momencie gdy światowy kryzys finansowy 
wybuchł z całą siłą, Japonia jeszcze nie zdążyła „wyjść na prostą” po okre-
sie długotrwałej stagnacji, spowodowanej pęknięciem bańki spekulacyj-
nego wzrostu z lat 90. XX w. To sprawiło, że jeszcze trudniejsze okazało 
się zmierzenie z nowymi wyzwaniami. Słaba koniunktura gospodarcza, 
wywołana skutkami światowego kryzysu finansowego, wraz z  tragedią 
trzęsienia ziemi i tsunami z 11 marca 2011 roku, skłoniła rząd do ogło-
szenia pakietu rozwiązań stymulujących wzrost i pobudzających poziom 
aktywności ekonomicznej. Polityka ta została nazwana „abenomiką” od 
nazwiska aktualnie urzędującego premiera Japonii, Shinzo Abe. 
Autor artykułu dokonuje najpierw charakterystyki japońskiej gospo-
darki, by na tym tle przyjrzeć się najważniejszym wyzwaniom, przed jaki-
4. 
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mi stoi dzisiejsza Japonia. W konkluzji autor zastanawia się nad efektyw-
nością tzw. trzech strzał „abenomiki”. Spośród trzech rodzajów polityk: 
monetarnej, fiskalnej oraz przemysłowej, jedynie ta ostatnia jest, zda-
niem A. Tanaki, w stanie dać realną receptę na wyjście z recesji. Poszu-
kiwanie nowych ekonomicznych możliwości, krajowych i zagranicznych, 
powinno przynieść dobre rezultaty w analizowanym zakresie. Korzystne 
dla Japonii z punktu widzenia ożywienia gospodarki wybory z pewno-
ścią będą dotyczyć także współpracy międzynarodowej Japonii z krajami 
Grupy Wyszehradzkiej.
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